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1. INTRODUCTION
The subject of this paper is David Hume’s account of moral freedom.1 Hume is traditionally
considered, alongside Thomas Hobbes, to be a classical compatibilist. In, Freedom and Moral Sentiment:
Hume’s Way of Naturalizing Responsibility, Paul Russell argues that the classical compatibilist
interpretation of Hume is misguided. In its place, Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Hume’s
account of freedom and moral responsibility. Two claims are central to Russell’s naturalist
interpretation: first, Hume regards moral responsibility as product of the moral sentiments, not
reason; and second, Hume’s account of moral freedom, the liberty of spontaneity, is derived from
his concept of moral responsibility, and not the other way around (as the classical compatibilist
interpretation suggests). Russell gives the label “feeling naturalism” to the first claim, and “scientific
naturalism” to the second one. On both of these points, Russell finds parallels between Hume and
P.F. Strawson.2
With his naturalistic interpretation, Russell claims that he can breathe new life into Hume’s
philosophy and bolster the larger naturalist research project in contemporary philosophy.
Nevertheless, Russell argues that Hume’s account of freedom and moral responsibility is flawed.
Insofar as Hume claims that moral responsibility is a product of the moral sentiments, Russell argues
that he must allow for cognitive-evaluative content in his account of passions. Otherwise,
attributions of responsibility could be the result of mere prejudice. Russell also argues that because,

I use the terms “free will,” “freedom,” and “moral freedom” interchangeably. For my purposes, it is
important to distinguish these three terms only from “political freedom,” which I do not consider in this
paper.
2 In his essay “Freedom and Resentment,” Strawson famously argued that our concept of moral
responsibility is composed of our reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, etc.). See P.F.
Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (New York: Routledge
Press, 2008). Because Russell spends a great deal of time considering the similarities between Strawson and
Hume in his book—and with good reason—I do so as well throughout this paper.
1

1

for Hume, moral judgments are made about character traits, these judgments fail to track the crucial
distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind.
While Russell’s concerns are reasonable, the force of his criticisms derives from three
matters of questionable interpretation. First, Russell construes Humean necessity as a regularity
theory, and argues that it commits him to the “dual ontology of existence” thesis, or a dualistic
metaphysics. Second, Russell takes Hume’s account of the passions to be purely descriptive and
mechanistic. Third, Russell’s claims that, for Hume, attributions of moral responsibility function
independently from considerations of moral freedom.
I argue that Hume can provide adequate responses to Russell. Following Annette Baier, I
propose that Hume’s concept of causal necessity is normative, being based on the correct functioning
of our rational capacities.3 This normative construal of causal necessity allows for a tight connection
between reason and the sentiments; which, combined with the insight that the sentiments are already
socially reflexive, yields an account of the passions that is both social and infused with reason. From this,
we learn that our character is judged to be a proper object of social praise and censure on account of
our moral competency, or our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows.
On account of the latter insights, I argue that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral
responsibility, but socializes it. My interpretation is not a radical departure from Russell’s naturalistic
reading, but a furthering of his project. Russell recognized that Hume’s account of moral
responsibility was both social and sentimental, but he failed to reevaluate Hume’s theory of moral
freedom in light of this fact. My object in this paper is to pick up where Russell left off; modifying
his view where it is necessary to do so.

Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1991).
3
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2. THE FREE WILL PROBLEM
2.1

The Bramhall and Hobbes Debate
In 1645, amidst the calamity of the English Civil War, two prominent intellectuals exiled

from their native soil convened in Paris to discuss the highest of metaphysical matters: the freedom
of the will. The first, Bishop John Bramhall, was a theologian equally well-known for his apologetics
and his unwavering support of the English monarchy. The second, Thomas Hobbes, was a scientist
and philosopher, whose recently published political treatise, De Cive, had greatly stirred the
European Respublica literaria.
Hobbes held a mechanistic world-view, influenced equally by Galileo and Vesalius, which
stated that both nature and human action are governed solely by the laws of motion.4 As he notes in
the Leviathan, “life is but a motion of the limbs, the beginning whereof is some principle within.” 5
The principle that Hobbes is alluding to is appetite and fear; for it is our appetites (desires, pleasures,
etc.) and fears (aversion, pains, etc.) that serve as the springs of all human action.6 In addition,
Hobbes was a necessitarian, as he judged that all events (natural and human) arose necessarily out of
their preceding conditions: “the sum of all those things which, being now existent, conduce and
concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the
effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof everyone is determined to be such

Galileo Galilei (1564-1642): Italian physicist, astronomer, mathematician, philosopher, and author of
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564): Dutch physician, anatomist, and
author of On the Fabric of the Human Body. Galileo and Vesalius are, in many ways, the fathers of the mechanist
philosophy.
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin Classics, 1968), 81.
6 “The motion, in which consisteth pleasure or pain, is also a solicitation or provocation either to draw near
to the thing that pleaseth, or to retire from the thing that displeaseth; and this solicitation is the endeavour or
internal beginning of animal motion, which when the object delighteth, is called appetite; when it displeaserth,
it is called aversion.” Thomas Hobbes, “Human Nature,” in British Moralists 1650-1800, vol. 1, ed. D.D.
Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 4.
4
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as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called…the decree of God.”7 The
concurrence of appetites felt by the human being is sufficient for all subsequent behavior; nothing
else is requited, as behavior flows mechanistically from the experience of desire or aversion.
Bramhall rejected Hobbes’ mechanism and necessitarianism. As a staunch libertarian,
Bramhall denied Hobbes’ conjecture that human action is governed solely by mechanistic laws.
Instead, human action is exercised through “the will,” the rational faculty of the mind that gives an
agent the “power of election” when she is confronted with potential courses of action.8 When God
offered to grant to King Solomon wisdom in exchange for the possibility of immeasurable riches,
Bramhall notes that “it was in his [King Solomon] own power to give it, and it was in his own power
to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retain it and if he did retain it, he could not give it.
Therefore we may do what we do not, and we do not what we might do. That is, we have true
liberty from necessity.”9 Bramhall argues that the reality of human choice secures our liberty from the
threat of Hobbes’ mechanistic philosophy.
The disagreement between Hobbes and Bramhall centers on the controversy regarding the
relation between liberty and necessity. Bramhall deems the task of reconciling liberty with necessity to
be to be woefully misguided because “necessity consists in an antecedent determination to
one…true liberty consists in the elective power of the rational will.”10 He reasons that “that which is
necessitated may agree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtain my subsequent consent; but
that which is determined without my concurrence or consent cannot be the object of my election.” 11
Bramhall argues that genuine liberty involves the ability to “elect” actions under conditions where
the agent has alternative possibilities, making liberty and necessity logically incompatible concepts. This
Vere Chappell, ed., Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 20.
8 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 1
9 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 2
10
Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 43
11 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 43
7
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seems like an intuitive position. If I could not—under the compulsion of the laws of nature—do
other than throw a rock through my neighbor’s window, it would surely be absurd to say that I was
free to throw the rock through her window. As Bramhall points out, “if the supposition be not in the
agent’s power, nor depend on anything in his power; if there be an exterior antecedent cause which
does necessitate the effect, to call this free is to be mad with reason.”12
Hobbes denies the antagonism between liberty and necessity. He argues that the concepts of
liberty and necessity, properly construed, are compatible with one another because all actions
(voluntary or otherwise) are the product of necessary causes: “whatsoever is produced is produced
necessarily, for whatsoever is produced has a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it has not been;
and therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.”13 Hobbes’ account of liberty, being thus
annexed to necessity, concerns the ability of an agent to do as she chooses to do, and not on her ability
to do otherwise. As he points out, “liberty is [simply] the absence of all the impediments to action that
are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent.” 14 An agent is at liberty to learn
how to play the violin if she both has the desire to learn how to play the violin, and the ability to do
so. Notice that this does not require that the agent elected the violin playing, for her desire to play
the violin may be determined. Nevertheless, on Hobbes’ view, we could rightfully say that her
learning to the play the violin was voluntary.
Bramhall defines the will as the legislative faculty of the human mind. It serves two
functions: imperatus (execution of action) and actus elicitus (election of action).15 In the first case, the
will dictates commands to the body. Bramhall gives the example of opening and closing one’s
eyelids. The will compels the body to open or shut the eyelids, causing direct movement in the

Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9
Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 38
14 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 38
15 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9
12
13
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muscle, which then opens or closes the eyelids.16 The second function of the will is to elect possible
courses of action. Once an action is selected by the will, the relevant lower faculties are determined
to comply. Compulsion derives from the will, but the will itself is not compelled; it is the causa sui of
all voluntary human action.17 This notion of the will “electing different courses of action” entails
that there truly are different courses of action available to him. Take the example of a heroin addict
named Bob, whose addiction drives him to take drastic actions to secure the drug. Because of his
addiction, Bob has the desire to rob a bank, and succeeds in doing so. Bob’s end state—acquiring
the funds for heroin—was realized as a result of his desire to rob the bank, which resulted from his
original desire to inject heroin. For Hobbes, Bob is spontaneously free to both shoot the heroin and
rob the bank since in both cases he has “done what he chose to do.” Bramhall would find the
conclusion that Bob freely chose to shoot the heroin to be dubious because his original desire to
inject the heroin was necessitated by his addiction to it. Because Bob did not elect for his desire to
shoot the heroin, it would be incorrect to hold him responsible for any action that necessarily
followed from the desire.18 For Bob to be genuinely free, he needs to enjoy a liberty of indifference, so
that his will may be undetermined in its choices.19
Hobbes agrees with Bramhall that the will is the cause of all voluntary human action.
However, because all actions are caused by the appetites for Hobbes, the will cannot be anything but
a type of appetite—in particular, an appetite that compels the agent to act. Hobbes gives a five-step
This, as Bramhall notes, is “in truth the act of some inferior faculty subject to the command of the will.”
He also refers to this act of the will as more “remote.” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9.
17 Bramhall notes that “This [an actus elicitus] may be stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of
the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have
some kind of omnipotence. But the will cannot be compelled to act repugnant to its inclination, as when a
stone is thrown upwards into the air; that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the same
time, which implies a contradiction.” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 9.
18 Bramhall notes that, in this case “I do it [the action] not out of any voluntary election, but out of an
inevitable necessity,” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 1
19 The “liberty of indifference” is a scholastic term used to describe a form of liberty that was absent all causal
necessitation. It is commonly contrasted with the “liberty of spontaneity,” which refers to a notion of liberty
that is consistent with causal necessitation, and holds that all actions are free insofar as they are uncompelled.
16
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mechanistic account of how this works. First, we encounter an external object. Second, we
experience a mix of aversion and appetite towards the object. Third, this creates the impetus for
deliberation, which takes places in an agent through an “alternate succession of appetite and fear.”20
Fourth, this deliberation eventually ceases due to the potency of a certain desire. Finally, this desire
results in a course of action. Controversially, Hobbes takes this last link in this chain of deliberation
simply to be the will: the passions…proceed not from, but are the will.”21 It doesn’t make sense on
Hobbes’ account to say that a willed action is not free. All actions that derive from internal desires
are free by definition. Hobbes’ only criterion for a free action is that it has “its beginning in the will.” 22
An agent fails to be free only when she is subject to external constraints on her actions. Bramhall
ridicules this “madness of reason”; but for Hobbes, freedom of spontaneity is the only freedom that
we could have.
The debate between Thomas Hobbes and Bishop John Bramhall represents what is at stake
in the controversy of the freedom of the will. Hobbes’ mechanism allows him to evade questions
about the metaphysical nature of the will.23 As a result, his account of the “freedom of spontaneity” is
reasonably straightforward. Nonetheless, many of Bramhall’s criticisms of Hobbes are convincing.
Hobbes does seem to overlook a “deeper sense” of freedom that most people consider necessary
for moral responsibility.24 Also, it seems that we can rationally deliberate about courses of action

See Thomas Hobbes, British Moralists 1650-1800 Vol. 1, ed. D.D. Raphael (Indiana: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1991), 15.
21 Hobbes, British Moralists, 16
22 Hobbes, British Moralists, 15
23 Contemporary philosophers of a more naturalist persuasion may be drawn to Hobbes’ account of freedom
because of his sole reliance on empirical observation in his analysis of voluntary action. Contrary to this,
Bramhall seems to give us a reconstruction of voluntary action that appeals to a rationalist faculty
psychology—a branch of metaphysics that has few defenders in contemporary philosophy.
24 Robert Kane captures this intuition perfectly: “It [an account of freedom like Hobbes] does seem to
capture the surface freedom…These everyday freedoms do seems to amount to (1) the power or ability to do
what we want (and the power to do otherwise, if we had wanted) and (2) doing so without any constraints or
impediments getting in our way…[but] does it also capture the ‘deeper’ freedom of the will?” Robert Kane, A
Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 14.
20
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separate from our desires—something for which Hobbes’ conception of the will doesn’t have room.
In what follows, I will consider David Hume’s attempt to put this controversy to rest.
2.2

Hume on the Will, Necessity, and Liberty
In 1739, David Hume published the first two books of his A Treatise of Human Nature.

Nestled in Book Two of the Treatise is Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity—a subject he
revisited in 1748, with the publication of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume is
commonly understood as being a Hobbesian about free will. Before further discussing how to
interpret Hume on these matters, it is important to get clearer on the definitions he employs of “the
will,” “necessity,” and “liberty” in his treatment of free will.
Hume expresses doubt about giving a concrete definition of “the will”: noting that “this
impression…’tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any farther; for which reason we
shall cut off all those definition and distinctions, with which philosophers are wont to perplex rather
than clear up this question” (T, 2.3.1.2). But, like Hobbes, he denies that it is the legislative faculty
of the mind. Instead, Hume treats the will as the most salient of the “direct passions”—those
impressions “which arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure” (T, 2.3.1.1). Other
direct passions that Hume considers are desire and aversion. These passions are direct because they
are fundamental experiences of pleasure and pain, the conjunction of which form “the chief spring
or actuating principle of the human mind” (T, 3.3.1.2). One can see why Hume would say this.
When one feels pleasure—say, upon listening to a Black Flag record—one experiences the desire to
listen to Black Flag records. Likewise, when one feels pain—say, upon listening to the newest Yanni
release—one experiences an aversion to listening to Yanni. But, the latter considerations make
Hume’s classification of “the will” as a direct passion puzzling. Does the will derive from our
affections of pain and pleasure? If so, this classification seems implausible because it would mean we
become aware of our will though purely passive means; by being affected.

8

I take it that there is an alternative explanation. Hume defines the will as “the internal
impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our
body, or new perception of our mind” (T, 2.3.1.2). This definition leads us to believe that the will is
not derived from our feelings of pleasure and pain, but forms the precondition of said feelings.25 Prior
to experiencing the pleasure of listening to a Black Flag record, one experiences opening the record
sleeve, taking the record out, putting it on the turntable, and placing the needle on the record. Along
the way, one is conscious of one’s bodily movement, and one’s intent to listen to the record. The
affection that accompanies one’s playing the record will depend on the content of playing the record.
If it is a Black Flag record that one is playing, one will feel pleasure; if it is a Yanni record, one will
feel pain. Either way, prior to the experience of desire or aversion, one is conscious of the basic
physical and mental activities that compose one’s “playing the record”—that is to say, one is
conscious of one’s own “will.”
In some ways, Hume’s account of the will resembles that of Hobbes. After all, Hume does
not consider the the will to be, in Bramhall’s words, “the root, the fountain” of reason. 26 Say that
you deliberately decided to cheat on a test. Bramhall would explain your decision to cheat as follows:
your rational will elected your desire to cheat on the test, and then dictated to the relevant faculties
that they would enable you fulfill this desire. Hobbes considers this explanation to be nonsense.
There is no election of the desire to cheat on the test that can be identified as “the will,” for the will is
simply the appetite that moved you (necessarily) to cheat on the test. Nevertheless, Hobbes and
Bramhall both agree that, under the above description, you have willed to cheat on the test. This is
not the case for Hume. The will is not something that we have, properly speaking, as it is both

This interpretation is strengthened by Hume’s comment that “Of all the immediate effects of pain and
pleasure, there is none more remarkable than the WILL; and tho’, properly speaking, it be not comprehended among
the passions, yet as the full understanding of its nature and properties, is necessary to the explanation of them, we shall here
make it the subject of our enquiry” (T, 2.3.1.2) [emphasis mine].
26 Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 43.
25
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constituted by and experienced through our various impressions of thought and action. My will is
only transparent to me through its activity (in both acting and thinking), making the impression of
willing, in some sense, epiphenomenal to acting or thinking itself. Hume remains agnostic about
whether particular actions or thoughts are voluntary, as his solution to this problem presented in
experience is to appeal to the concept of causal necessity.27
Hume drastically parts from both Hobbes and Bramhall in claiming that we do not discover
necessity, but experience it as a vivid impression received from a repeated course of events. Hume
points out that the idea of necessity “arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations
of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by
custom to infer the one from the appearance to the other” (EHU, 64). The idea of causal necessity is
composed of two parts: the experience of constant conjunction between perceptions, and an
inference from one perception to the other. I notice that every time I drop a glass on my hardwood
floor, the glass breaks. The dropping of the glass and the glass breaking are two separate
perceptions, but they are constantly conjoined with one another: there is never a dropped glass
perception without a broken glass perception. But constant conjunction is not sufficient for the idea
of causal necessity: “besides that experience…we may establish the relation of priority by a kind of
inference or reasoning” (T, 1.3.2.7). It is our experience of temporal priority of the “glass dropping”
to the “glass breaking” that warrants the inference that the former caused the latter. The necessity of
the causal inference derives from the repeated instances of the constant conjunction. We feel that
the connection between the glass dropping and it breaking is necessary because the perceptions are
Hume expands on this topic in a footnote in the first Enquiry. He points out that, in performing actions we
“have a false sensation or seeming experience…of liberty or indifference.” At the same time “we may
observe, that, though, in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but
are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives” (EHU, 72, note 1). Our
feeling of willing is inconclusive evidence for our voluntary willing. It appears that, for Hume, we need a
stronger criterion than phenomenal experience to decide whether or not a particular action or thought is
voluntary. This latter point sets his treatment of “the will” at odds with the accounts that Bramhall and
Hobbes give.
27
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constantly conjoined. As Hume points out, “this [necessary] connexion, therefore, which we feel in
the mind, the customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the
sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion” (EHU,
59).
It is easy to see how Hume applies the concept of causal necessity to natural objects. His
more divisive claim is that the idea of causal necessity applies to human action as well. For Hume,
we feel a necessary connexion between our beliefs and actions: “it appears not only that the
conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as any part of nature,
but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind” (EHU
88). When I see my friend go to get a drink from the water fountain, I infer that she is thirsty. I
automatically make this inference because I have seen others do so, and have done the same myself.
Never do I find myself in a state of perplexity at the situation, for “the union betwixt motives and
actions has the same constancy, as that in any natural operations” (T. 2.3.1.14). This transition from
natural to human objects may seem to be unjustified, but remember that Hume provides us a
psychological account of causal necessity. But because we make use of the same perceptual faculties
to cognize both natural and human objects, Humean necessity (constant conjunction and causal
inference) will apply equally to both. So what is it that enables human agents to enjoy liberty?
Hume offers his canonical statement of liberty in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:
“by liberty, then we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will;
that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this
hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains”
(EHU 73). Liberty requires that our actions be representative of our desires. If we enjoy liberty, then
we have the ability to act in accordance with out desires. Hume’s account of liberty does not exclude
causation, as the preconditions for liberty require that the action be caused by the agent’s desires; but
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it does exclude compulsion, where this means impediments on the agent’s action separate from the
agent’s desire. The conception of liberty Hume expresses here simply is the “liberty of spontaneity,”
as discussed in the previous section. Like Hobbes, Hume argues that the liberty of spontaneity is the
only plausible way of conceiving liberty. Bramhall’s resistance to this idea lies in his conflation of
causation with compulsion: whereas the latter refers to external impediments to an agent exercising
her will, the former refers to the internal mechanisms that make it the case that she acts at all. Rather
than constraining us, the necessary connection between our actions and motives gives us (as well as
other people) the ability to understand our actions as genuinely ours. Hume notes that “liberty [of
indifference], by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance”
(T, 2.3.1.18). Our practices of holding each other responsible depend on the idea that our actions are
necessarily linked with our motives; for if we cannot link motivation to action, we can never
consider someone to be genuinely responsible for their actions.
2.3

Classical Compatibilism and Hume
When it comes to the problem of free will, the vast majority of philosophers in the twentieth

century have taken Hume to be Hobbesian. The label that philosophers have introduced to capture
both of their views is classical compatibilism. As we established, a compatibilist like Hobbes or Hume
maintains that liberty, properly construed, is compatible with the doctrine of necessity. Classical
compatibilism, represented most definitively by Hobbes, defines liberty as the ability to choose
spontaneously. Contemporary philosophers present Hobbesian liberty as having two parts: a “power or
ability requirement” and an “absence of constraint requirement.”28 For the classical compatibilist, S
is free to Φ iff S has the ability to Φ and S’s attempt to Φ is not interfered with. Because classical
compatibilism defines “liberty” within the bounds of “necessity,” an agent’s voluntary action is
always subject to the laws of causal necessity. What makes an agent’s action voluntary is not that it
28
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lies outside the jurisdiction of necessary causal laws, but that the determination of his action flows
from his will and not from the will of others. Instead of directly answering the incompatibilist
challenge to provide a genuine account of action election, classical compatibilism attempts to modify
the grounds of the debate by shifting the conversation from voluntary willing to voluntary action.
Because of this, the incompatibilist charges that the compatibilist has missed the point: if one cannot
elect one’s action then one’s action cannot be considered voluntary. In response, the compatibilist
argues that the incompatibilist is simply confused about the nature of liberty: to will voluntarily
simply is the ability to act as one chooses.
How does classical compatibilism apply more specifically to what Hume says about free will?
Paul Russell presents three “arguments” that Hume puts forth in both the Treatise and the first
Enquiry to highlight the spirit of the classical compatibilist interpretation. Russell calls the first
argument the necessity argument—the conclusion of which states that causal necessity is nothing but
“the constant conjunction of objects and the inference of the mind from one object to the other.” 29
The necessity argument is conjoined with two liberty arguments, the first of which Russell refers to as
the spontaneity argument. The spontaneity argument claims that “voluntary action is to be
distinguished from involuntary action not by the absence of necessitation (as is suggested by the
liberty of indifference), but rather by a different type of cause.”30 The second liberty argument is the
antilibertarian argument, which concludes that the liberty of indifference, if actual, would abolish the
possibility of free actions.31 The three arguments, taken as a whole, constitute Humean classical
compatibilism according to Russell. Liberty and necessity are taken to be compatible with one
another because liberty, properly construed, consists solely in the ability to do as one chooses. My
decision to learn how to ride a bike may be causally necessitated by my desire not to be made fun of
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by my peers; but insofar as my desire is genuinely mine, the fact that this desire necessitated my
decision to learn how to ride a bike does not render my action involuntary.32 Likewise, consider if
my desire not to be made fun of by my peers did not causally necessitate my decision to learn how
to ride a bike. What if my action could not be causally linked to any of my desires, wishes,
intentions, etc? Would we choose to call my action voluntary? Hume does not think we would. A
tight causal link between my motives and my action seems, perhaps counterintuitively, to be required
for liberty.
Russell claims that the classical compatibilist approach to free will is rationalist in two
senses.33 First, classical compatibilism is concerned with the logic of concepts we make use of in
discussion about freedom and moral responsibility, a strategy Russell says involves “a priori
reflections about the meanings of the terms involved.”34 That is to say, the classical compatibilist makes
use of conceptual analysis in his treatment of free will, with the aim to clearing up any linguistic
confusion that impedes the debate. As Russell points out, the classical compatibilist argues that it is
“because we confuse [our concepts of] causation with force and compulsion we mistakenly conclude
that freedom (and responsibility) requires the absence of causation and necessity.” 35 The second
sense in which Russell takes classical compatibilism to be rationalist is in its treatment of the
“problem of moral responsibility” as reducible to the “problem of free will.” For the classical
compatibilist, to be morally responsible just is to be free. As Russell puts it, advocates of classical
As Hobbes points out: “liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the
nature and instrinsical quality of an agent,” Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, 38.
33 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 171. Here, it is important to not conflate the form of “rationalism” that
Russell is concerned with and the “rationalism” that people often speak of in discussions of Early Modern
philosophy. Russell is not claiming that Hume is a rationalist in the sense that Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza
are thought to be. Instead, he argues that Hume qua classical compatibilist interpretation is a rationalist in the
sense that he approaches the free will problem with the tool-kit of something like conceptual analysis. Russell
contrasts this latter form of rationalism with naturalism, which “relies on empirical observations regarding the
nature and circumstances, or moral psychology, involved in actual ascriptions of moral responsibility” in its
treatment of free will. See Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 14.
34 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 14
35 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 4
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compatibilism believe that “any adequate interpretation and discussion of moral responsibility must
begin with, or develop out of, some relevant and appropriate account of the nature of moral
freedom.”36 In order to be responsible, we have to be free; and in order to be free, we have to act
voluntarily. Russell claims that Hume parts from classical compatibilism on both of these points:
approaching the problems of freedom and moral responsibility from the perspective of naturalism,
and not rationalism. I will discuss Russell’s alternate interpretation in the following chapter.
The popularity of classical compatibilism has waned in recent years due to pressure from
more sophisticated forms of incompatibilism. And one can see why. Going back to the example I
used previously in my discussion of Bramhall: it doesn’t seem to be the case that Bob the drug
addict is free in his robbing of the bank simply because he both acts from a desire and enjoys noninterference in his action. Bob suffers from an addiction that blocks his ability to elect possible
desires and actions. Any theory of freedom that considers Bob’s spontaneous action to be voluntary
must be impoverished. It follows that if we take classical compatibilism to be representative of
Hume’s position on freedom and moral responsibility, we should conclude, along with Russell, that
“Hume’s thinking on this subject is now dated and somewhat passé.”37
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3. NATURALIZING THE PROBLEM: PAUL RUSSELL ON HUME
3.1

The Regularity Theory of Causation
In his book, Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume’s Ways of Naturalizing Moral Responsibility, Paul

Russell argues that the classical compatibilist interpretation of Hume is flawed on two grounds. First,
he claims that Hume’s concept of causal necessity (constant conjunction and inference of the mind)
undermines the classical compatibilist account of liberty (liberty of spontaneity). Second, Russell
argues that the classical compatibilist interpretation fails to recognize the central role the passions
play in Hume’s account of moral responsibility. On account of these criticisms, Russell concludes
that Hume eschews the rationalism of classical compatibilism for a more naturalistic approach to the
problems of free will and moral responsibility. In this section, I will only be concerned with Russell’s
first criticism of the classical compatibilist interpretation.
Russell argues that Hume holds a regularity theory of causation, which he differentiates from
a metaphysical theory of causation—where the latter is understood as giving an account of the causal
structure of the world, and the former is taken to give an account of our perceptions of that world.38
One can see why Russell would attribute a regularity theory of causation to him; after all, Hume
claims that “the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly
reach any experience of their connexion with objects” (EHU, 119). Hume explicitly refrains from
making judgments about various “powers” or “forces” that underlie our perception of constant
conjunction (EHU, 50). And so, following Russell’s reasoning, Hume simply cannot accept a
metaphysical theory of causation. Hume appears to be much more interested in the psychology of
causation and causal inference. As Russell points out, for Hume “the connexion we think of as
holding between cause and effect turns out to be the same as that which holds between our
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perceptions whereby one idea naturally introduces the other. Thus, the necessary connexion turns
out to be an association between our perceptions.” 39 It is an account of how this process of
association functions that Hume is concerned to give in his treatment of causation (EHU, 59).
Classical compatibilism, according to Russell, presupposes a metaphysical theory of the
causation. The classical compatibilist account of freedom, the liberty of spontaneity, distinguishes
between those causes that are internal to the agent (desires, intentions, etc.) and those that are external
to him (laws of nature, etc.). For a classical compatibilist to consider an action to be voluntary, it must
be the case that the action was the result of a necessary, internal cause. Russell claims that because
Hume defines causal necessity in terms of our perceptions, and not objects, our causal inferences are
limited to saying that two perceptions are regularly conjoined. For this reason, Russell argues that
Hume does not have the resources to establish that a particular action was the result of an agent’s
motives or desires, and thus he is unable to discover whether or not the action in question was truly
voluntary: “the liberty argument presupposes that any adequate theory of responsibility must
establish that agents produce or determine their actions, and are thereby, connected with their deeds.
The necessity argument suggests that there exist only constant conjunctions between these objects
(i.e., willings and actions) and that these constant conjunctions do not reveal or uncover any power
or agency in any cause, nor any connexions between cause and effect.”40
Russell argues that a result of Hume’s regularity theory of causation is that it commits him to
the “double-ontology of existence” thesis. There are two components to this view: first, that “we
naturally suppose that there exists a material world of bodies and that they operate on one another
‘independent of our thought and reasoning’”; and second, that “in ordinary life we ‘confound
perceptions and objects’ and thereby naturally ‘transfer’ those connexions which we ‘feel’ between
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our perceptions to the bodies (i.e. bodies) themselves.” 41 We believe that a world exists separate
from our perceptions of it, but we understand that we only have knowledge of this world through
our perceptual faculties. Our belief in the external world is central to our understanding, since “we
must take it for granted in all of our reasonings” (T, 1.4.2.1). To put it in Strawsonian terms, the
belief in an external world is a commitment of ours.42 As a result of this commitment, and because we
recognize (at least when we are being careful with our reasoning) that our perceptions fail to tell us
anything about the world apart from the functioning of these faculties, we are stuck with two
realities.43
At times, Hume does seem to assert the double-ontology of existence thesis: “philosophy
informs us, that every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is
interrupted, and dependent on the mind; whereas the vulgar confound perceptions and objects” (T,
1.4.2.14). However, I propose that Hume’ distinction between perceptions and their objects is
epistemological and not metaphysical. Consider his discussion of skepticism in the Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding. Hume derides Cartesian skepticism because it eliminates the possibility of
human knowledge: “the Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any
human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring
Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 46
P.F. Strawson speaks of Hume’s affirmation of the existence of an external world as an “unavoidable
natural conviction, commitment, or prejudice [that is] ineradicably implanted in our minds by Nature.” P.F.
Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 19. Earlier,
in the same work, he notes that “his [Hume’s] point is really the very simple one that, whatever arguments
may be produced on one side or the other of the question, we simply cannot help believing in the existence of
body,” 11.
43 One need not conclude with Russell that there is a metaphysical distinction between “objects” and “bodies”
for Hume. Instead, one could claim, along with Strawson, “Hume, then, we may say, is ready to accept and to
tolerate a distinction between two levels of thought: the level of philosophically critical thinking which can
offer us no assurances against skepticism; and the level of everyday empirical thinking, at which the
pretension of critical thinking are completely overridden and suppressed by Nature,” Skepticism and Naturalism:
Some Varieties, 13. Later, Strawson refers to these “levels of thought” as standpoints that one can take, neither
of which is opposed to one another: “the appearance of a contradiction arises only if we assume the existence
of some metaphysically absolute standpoint from which we can judge between the two standpoints,” 39. The
distinction between the two levels of thought—skepticism and naturalism—is not a metaphysical distinction
then. I will make another version of this point against Russell in Chapter 3.
41
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us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject” (EHU, 116). Hume finds this conclusion
distasteful, and proposes a more mitigated form of skepticism—represented by the Ancient Greek
schools. The latter form of skepticism urges that “the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended
on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by consideration, derived from the nature
of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them,
within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and falsehood” (EHU, 117). Surely this more ancient
form of skepticism recognizes a gap between perceptions and their objects, but it is an
epistemological gap, and not a metaphysical one. The skeptical schools are meant to teach us
moderation in our causal inferences; not that such inferences are impossible.
The problem with the double-ontology of existence thesis, on a philosophical level, is simply
stated: if the distinction between “objects” and “perceptions” is a metaphysical one, and not merely an
epistemological one, then we have no criterion by which to judge the extent to which our perceptions
of objects “hook up” with the objects themselves. Further, Russell’s interpretation of Hume’s
account of causation as a regularity theory is equally problematic on Humean grounds. If causal
inferences lie at the base of all knowledge claims about matter of fact as Hume thinks they do (T,
1.3.2), and our inferences can only pick out “regularities,” then we have no rule to demarcate correct
causal inferences from incorrect ones. Yet, Hume assumes that “there be no such thing as chance in
the world,” and thus commits himself to the view that there are correct causal inferences to be made
(EHU, 46). I explore this topic further in Chapter 3, section 2.
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3.2

Feeling Naturalism
Russell argues that the classical compatibilist interpretation fails to take into account the

central role the moral sentiments play in Hume’s account of moral responsibility. The moral
sentiments are central to what Russell calls Hume’s naturalization of the problems of free will and
moral responsibility. Russell parses naturalism in two ways: scientific naturalism and feeling
naturalism. Whereas classical compatibilism claims that an agent is morally responsible if her action
is voluntary, feeling naturalism maintains that an agent is morally responsible if she is the object of a
sentiment of approbation or disapprobation. Likewise, while classical compatibilism approaches the
problem of free will with the tools of conceptual analysis, scientific naturalism undertakes an “a
posteriori project of describ[ing] the circumstances under which people are felt to be responsible.”44 In
this section, I will be concerned with feeling naturalism component of Russell’s interpretation.
Central to Russell’s interpretation of Hume as a “feeling naturalist” is his reading of Hume’s account
of the passions. Before we get into Russell’s interpretation of the Humean passions, it is necessary to
lay some groundwork.45
Hume distinguishes between two kinds of passions: calm and violent. Calm passions concern
“beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects,” while the violent passions are
those of “love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility” (T, 2.1.1.3). The difference between the
two is one of vivacity. Hume makes a further distinction between direct and indirect passions. The
direct passions (desire, aversion, grief, joy, etc.) are those which “arise immediately from good or evil,
from pain or pleasure,” while indirect passions (pride, humility, ambition, vanity, etc.) are those that
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The following account of the passions, though detailed, will become especially important for my treatment
of Russell’s interpretation of Hume in Chapter 3.
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“proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities” (T, 2.1.2.4).46 The
qualities that Hume speaks of here are explained by the principles of association: contiguity,
resemblance, cause and effect.47 One can see why Hume would make this distinction between direct
and indirect passions. If I see an apple on a table and remember that I receive pleasure from eating
apples, ceteris paribus, I may desire to grab the apple and eat it. However, I will never experience guilt at
my eating the apple unless it was the case that the apple belonged to someone else: that is to say,
unless my passion of desire can be mediated through another person’s feeling of disapprobation at
wrongly eating the apple (i.e., they did not give me permission to eat it, etc.). Indirect passions are
then, at bottom, social passions.48
The indirect passions consist of two parts: the object of the passion (self, other, natural
object), and the sensation that accompanies the passion (pain or pleasure). A specific passion is
produced by a “double relation of ideas and impressions,” whereby the “cause, which excites the
passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the
cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion” (T, 2.1.5.5). Say I feel pity for a
friend who has just lost her father. The sensation (impression) of the passion is pain, while the object of
Hume also includes “the will” in his account of the direct passions (2.3.1). But, as I argued in the previous
chapter, there is reason to believe that he takes the will to be a necessary component of one’s experience of the
direct passions, but not as one of the direct passions themselves.
47 See Treatise, 1.1.4. Hume claims that the relationship between passions (say, between malice and pride)
functions according to associations of resemblance: “nature has bestow’d a kind of attraction on certain
impressions and ideas, by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative” (T,
2.1.5.10). That said, all indirect passions “require the existence of some foreign object, and that the organs,
which produce it, exert not themselves like the heart and arteries, by an original internal movement” (T,
2.1.5.7). It follows from this that associations of cause and effect are required for the function of our indirect
passions, and so the latter are then dependent on the tools of causal inference. One cannot feel pride about
the state of one’s garden unless it is also true that one believes that (1) one’s garden is one’s own, and (2) that
there is a necessary connexion between the state of one’s garden and it being one’s own. Otherwise, the
passions of pride would be improper.
48 Annette Baier makes the case that direct passions are also social. She finds evidence for this in the fact that
Hume treats the indirect passions before the direct passions in the Treatise, which leads her to believe that
Hume treats the direct passions as “abstractions” from our more social indirect passion. This is not to say
that Baier thinks direct passions reduce to indirect passions; it is just that the former are dependent on the
latter for their existence. I will pursue this line of thought further in Chapter 3. See A Progress of Sentiments,
133-135. Baier makes a similar point about the relation between impressions and ideas: see 34-35.
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the passion is my friend (idea). The cause of my pity was her father dying. This cause produced an
independent feeling of pain (impression), which was then bolstered by the fact that the death was of
my friend’s father (idea). The relation of these two ideas and impression created the passion “pity
for my friend on account of the death of her father” in me. Notice that Hume is claiming that we
feel pain on two fronts: the fact of death, and the fact that it was my friend’s father who died. This
may seem unlikely, until one takes into account the central role that sympathy plays in Hume’s
account of the indirect passions: “no quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and
in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by
communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our
own” (T, 2.1.11.2). Because we naturally sympathize with our fellows, news of the death of
someone’s father will cause us pain, even if the pain is minimal. However, this pain receives
“additional weight and authority” when affixed to the idea of my friend (T, 2.1.12.19).
The moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation—the constituents of Humean moral
judgments—are classified as calm, indirect passions.49 These passions comprise the distinction
between virtue and vice: when one’s sentiment of approbation is directed at the conduct or character
of another agent, we judge that the agent is virtuous; when an agent is the object of our
disapprobation, we deem him vicious. But, while our moral sentiments may take another agent’s
action as its object—say, an agent’s giving to charity—Hume claims that “if any action be either
virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only as a sign of some quality of character. It must depend upon durable
principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter in the personal character”
(T, 3.3.1.4). That is to say: when we deem someone virtuous on account of her giving to charity, we
There is controversy concerning whether or not Hume can rightfully speak of “moral judgments,” as he
argues at length that “the approbation of moral qualities most certainly is not deriv’d from reason, or any
comparison of ideas; but proceeds entirely from a moral taste, and from certain sentiments of pleasure or
disgust” (T, 3.3.1.15). I will speak of moral judgments because this is the language that Russell employs. I also
happen to believe, contrary to what may seem to be the case, that Hume’s account of responsibility attribution
is best cast in the language of moral judgment.
49
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are making a judgment about her character; namely, that she is benevolent. If we knew this agent to
be a prideful person, we may judge her conduct differently; we may judge that she gave to charity out
of self-interest. In the latter case, Hume thinks that we would be hesitant to praise her action. This
fact shows that our moral sentiments are ultimately directed at an agent’s character, and though
“actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but
‘tis only so far as they are such indications, that they are attended with love or hatred, praise or
blame” (T, 3.3.1.5).
According to Russell, Hume’s account of the passions is a “feeling theory.” 50 On this view,
the violent, amoral, passions (love, hate, etc.) are distinguished from the calm, moral, passions based
on how they feel to the agent.51 Say I feel love towards myself, and hatred towards another. Russell
reads Hume as making the following point: my self-directed love will feel differently than my otherdirected hatred, and so we can know that love and hatred are different passions. Further insight into
the relation between the calm and violent passions will be received from considerations about the
kind of effect they have on us, for we may “infer them from the behavior they have aroused in us.” 52
The latter is centrally important to understanding the calm passions because they are “so soft an
emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible” (T. 2.1.1.3). It follows that, though we can
distinguish between violent and calm passion on account of the feelings they produce in us, when it
Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 88
Russell notes that “Hume’s feeling theory of emotion commits him to the view that the moral sentiments
feel different from all other passions and that this sui generis constitutes the very nature or essence of moral
sentiment.” Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 89. I take it that Russell’s classification of Hume as a
proponent of the “feeling theory” here is misguided because he takes “feeling” to be phenomenological and
not somatic. The traditional formulation of the “feeling theory,” presented by William James and Carl G.
Lange, stated that emotions were to be defined on the basis of certain effects they were having on the body:
“we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and [it is] not that we cry,
strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.” See William James, “What is an
Emotion?” Mind, 9: 188–205. The “feeling theory” maps onto Russell’s second formulation of Hume’s view:
that the passions may be defined on the basis of the effect they have on the body, but not the first
formulation: that emotions are sensations. Because the latter view is utterly inane, we have reason to believe
that Russell is engaged in hyperbole against Hume.
52 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 90
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comes to kinds of calm passions, we can only differentiate between them on the basis of
physiological or behavioral evidence.
Likewise, when we are trying to infer the existence of a particular passion (either violent or
calm) in another agent, we will only have physical evidence to draw our inferences from, as we
cannot share in the feelings of another. This is precisely why Hume takes the consideration of
conduct to be so centrally important to understanding others: “when I see the effects of passion in
the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes,
and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself” (T,
3.3.1.6). It is the passion that motivated the person’s conduct, and not the conduct itself, that
produces a feeling of approbation or disapprobation in us. If we see someone kick a dog, and infer
that they did so in order to get the dog out of the road (lest it get hit by a car), we will feel differently
about him than if we infer that he kicked the dog out of malice.
We do not receive praise or censure on the basis of our actions themselves (even our
intentional ones). Instead, it is our actions that reveal stable or enduring character traits that subject
us to moral sentiment. On Russell’s reading of Hume, we are “responsible for [our] character in the
sense that it is (beliefs about) character that generates moral sentiment.”53 This does not require that
we have actively shaped our character: we can be held responsible for who we are regardless of
whether or not the traits that constitute us were voluntarily chosen. Russell finds evidence for this
reading in Hume’s treatment of excusing conditions, or the conditions under which we let someone off
the hook, morally speaking. He claims that “Hume holds that excusing conditions must be explained
or accounted for with reference to character.” 54 So, when we excuse someone for her conduct, we
must always do so on basis that the action in question was incongruous with the character that we
know the agent to have. For example, if your friend was known to be kind, we may excuse a
53
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particular outburst he made under pressure because we understand that it did not reflect the
kindness we know him to have. Though we could let your friend off for his “out of character”
conduct, we could not let him off the hook for his character. According to Russell then, Hume is not
concerned with the voluntary or involuntary nature of the character in question, but with the
“character doing the acting.”55
Nevertheless, Russell argues that this does not mean that Hume does not concern himself
with moral freedom. If a person were forced to shoot the president because an evil neuroscientist
was controlling the firing of his neurons, we would consider her action involuntary, and her
character untainted. But, as Russell points out, the moral sentiments reach beyond matters of
conduct, and take character traits or qualities of mind as their objects as well: “feeling and desires,
even though they might never engage the will or direct our intentions, are distinct and vital
indications or signs of a person’s character and qualities of mind, and, as such, they are quite capable
of arousing moral sentiments toward that person.”56 It follows from this that there can be moral
judgments about involuntary, or non-willed, aspects of one’s character.57 Russell takes this fact to
prove that the liberty of spontaneity is not a necessary condition of being taken as object of the
sentiments of approbation or disapprobation, and so that “the sphere of responsibility, therefore,
extends beyond the sphere of action and liberty of spontaneity.”58
I do think that Russell’s criticism of the classical compatibilist interpretation is right. Clearly,
Hume’s account of the passions is central to his theory of moral responsibility. However, I disagree
with him on two fronts. First, I am skeptical of Russell’s “feeling theory” interpretation of the
Human passions, which amounts to a descriptive story of various reactions, almost chemical in nature,
Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 102
Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 119
57 Russell notes that “on Hume’s account, there are other channels, independent of will and intention,
through which an agent can reveal her moral character and qualities of mind,” Freedom and Moral Sentiment,
119.
58 Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 119
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firing in our minds; reactions that have no necessary connections to the objects they are meant to be
reactions of. I am willing to grant that Hume is a “sentimentalist” about moral responsibility, but not
that he holds a “feeling theory” of the passions. Second, I am skeptical of Russell’s claim that Hume
considers the sphere of moral responsibility to extend beyond considerations of freedom. Perhaps
the sphere extends beyond the “liberty of spontaneity,” but I argue that it does not extend past
freedom itself. I expand on both of these points in Chapter 3.
3.3

Scientific Naturalism
The classical compatibilist, or philosophical rationalist more generally, looks at the problems

of free will and moral responsibility and asks two questions: “are the concepts we are working with
coherent?” and “do these concepts apply to human beings?” Contrary to rationalist, the scientific
naturalist starts not with the concepts, but with the facts of the case.59 The naturalist looks to our
social lives and discovers that we naturally hold one another responsible. It is a fact, as Russell puts it,
that “men regard other people as objects of praise or blame—that is, they hold them responsible.”60
It is also the case that people automatically draw inferences about one another’s character by taking
their conduct as evidence. When we see someone steal, we naturally search for the motives that
pushed him do so; and from these motives, we decide whether or not the stealing was blameworthy
or praiseworthy. It is the conjunction of these two facts—that we naturally hold one another
responsible, and that we automatically infer a person’s motivations from their actions—that explains
our concept of “moral responsibility.” For the naturalist, our concept of responsibility is no more in
need of justification than our concept of friendship is. As Russell points out, “naturalists do not ask
‘Does the concept of responsibility have any application to human beings?’ Rather, they ask, ‘Do the
attitudes, sentiments, and practices which are constitutive of responsibility have any adequate or proper
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justification?”61 A naturalist philosopher may seek to reform a particular conception of responsibility
on the grounds that it does not cohere with what we know about ourselves and the world, but he
cannot reform the concept of responsibility itself; not without drastically redefining what it is to be
us.
So how does the scientific naturalism approach the problem of free will? As we saw in the
previous section, to hold someone responsible for Hume is to “regard them as the object of a
certain kind of passion—namely, a moral sentiment.”62 It is a fact that we do hold one another
responsible. It also appears that, when we hold someone responsible, our moral sentiments are
directed at their motivation or character, and not their action itself. We feel differently when an agent
maliciously runs someone over with their vehicle, as opposed to when she does so accidently. We may
accuse the latter person of gross negligence, while we will consider the former character to be
vicious. As Russell points out, if we did not have the ability to attribute motivations to people, we
would not be able to come to a decision about whether the person should be held responsible:
“without knowledge of anyone’s character, no sentiment of approbation or blame would be aroused
in us. Therefore, without inference, no one would be an object of praise or blame—that is to say, no
one would be regarded as responsible for her actions.” 63 This fact also requires that an agent’s
motives and her actions be fixed together in some way. If there were no regular connection between
what an agent did, and what she intended to do, she could not rightfully be held responsible for her
conduct. I draw to conclusions from this. First, Humean necessity (constant conjunction and mental
inference) is “psychologically essential to ascriptions of responsibility, because in the absence of the
relevant regularities and inferences, the regular mechanism which produces our moral sentiments
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would simply fail to function.”64 And second, “liberty of spontaneity is (psychologically) essential to
responsibility because it is only in these circumstances (i.e., in which we discover constant
conjunctions between motives and actions) that it is possible for us to draw the specific kinds of
inferences required to generate the moral sentiments.”65 Russell sees a modern proponent of the
scientific naturalism in P.F. Strawson.
In his 1962 article “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson claims that the two
interlocutors in the free will debate—whom he labels the optimists and the pessimists—have
reached an impasse. The pessimist, a card-carrying incompatibilist, asserts that determinism is true
and that, as a result, we are not free. It follows from this conclusion, the pessimist argues, that “our
concepts of moral obligation and responsibility really have no application, and the practices of
praising and blaming, of expressing moral condemnation and approval, are really unjustified.” 66
Conversely, the optimist, a classical compatibilist of sorts, agrees with the pessimist that determinism
is true, but she claims that our concepts of freedom and moral responsibility “in no way lose their
raison d'être” because of the utility they serve in making moral judgments and doling out punishments
for harmful acts.67
Strawson argues that we should bracket, at least for the time being, the question of
determinism and its impact on free will. Instead, we should focus our attention on what he calls the
reactive attitudes: those “non-detached attitudes and reactions of people directly involved in
transaction with each other; of the attitudes and reactions of offended parties and beneficiaries; of
such things as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings.”68 It is these attitudes,
Strawson argues, and not our philosophical concepts of “freedom” and “moral responsibility” that
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give form to our actual practices of taking one another as free and holding one another morally
responsible. If my friend steals my bike, I may feel resentment towards him. For Strawson, my
resentment is constitutive of my holding him responsible for stealing the bike. There is no need for
me to reference my theory of free will to decide whether or not my friend was really responsible; my
resentment has already done this. But what is the justification of my resentment? According to
Strawson, there need not be any external justification for my reactive attitude. It is simply a fact about
our nature that we attach a great importance to the “attitudes and intention [directed] towards us of
those who stand in these relations to us and the great extent to which our personal feelings and
reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions.” 69 In other
words: in virtue of our humanity, we are committed to these reactive attitudes insofar as they give
form to our social lives.
Of course, someone may claim that we ought not to be committed to our reactive attitudes.
Perhaps I spent the afternoon after my friend stole my bike reading Spinoza, and I came across the
following passage: “in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from
the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.” 70 I think to myself:
“I should not feel resentment towards my friend because, after all, he was determined to steal the
bike.” In thinking this, I have decided to take the theoretical point of view towards my friend,
treating him as an object of analytic study, and not the proper object of reactive attitudes. But in
order to take this viewpoint seriously, I realize that it must be universalized, for insofar as my friend is
exempt from the reactive attitudes on determinist grounds, he shares this feature with all people,
including myself. Should I take my “theoretical point of view” to its logical conclusion and exempt
all people from the reactive attitudes?
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Strawson rejects this course of action on two grounds. First, he finds it psychologically
inconceivable: “we cannot, as we are, seriously envisage ourselves adopting a thoroughgoing
objectivity of attitude to others as a result of theoretical conviction of the truth of determinism.” 71
Although we may have the capability to take the “theoretical stance” in particular cases, we simply
cannot maintain it with regard to the whole of humanity because our interpersonal relationships,
which provide ultimate meaning to our lives, are predicated on the employment of the reactive
attitudes. Second, Strawson claims that when “we do in fact adopt such an attitude in a particular
case, our doing so is not the consequence of a theoretical conviction which might be expressed as
‘determinism in this case’, but is a consequence of our abandoning, for different reasons in different
cases, the ordinary inter-personal attitudes.”72 Take the example of a man named Bob who has
damage to his amygdala. Bob is inclined to take abnormally large risks, which leads him to gamble
most of his money away at the roulette table. We do not consider Bob to be the proper object of
our reactive attitudes, but not because he is determined; instead, we judge him thusly because he is
deficient in some way.
For Russell, the key point of scientific naturalism lies in the fact that “both these thinkers
[Hume and Strawson], in different ways, shift emphasis and attention from problems of freedom to
problems of responsibility. Instead of arguing that we interpret responsibility in terms of freedom, it
is suggested that we try to understand the conditions of freedom in terms of an empirically better
informed theory of responsibility.”73 The concept of moral freedom that Hume defends—the liberty
of spontaneity—does not provide a precondition for moral responsibility. Instead, this notion of
freedom is something that we arrive at through an analysis of the functioning our moral sentiments.
It turns out that in order to make sense of moral responsibility, we need to presuppose something
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like a non-metaphysical version of the liberty of spontaneity. This naturalistic line of reasoning takes
Hume far from the previously considered classical compatibilist interpretation.
Unlike the construal of Hume as a feeling naturalist, I tend to agree with Russell’s construal of
him as a scientific naturalist. That said, I argue that the particular kind of scientific naturalism that
Russell saddles Hume with is overly reductive, being focused more on the internal bare form, or
mechanical functioning of the moral sentiments than with their social content, or the ways in which
they are shaped by our interactions with one another. In this way, I think Hume is even closer to
Strawson than Russell even realizes.
3.4

Does Hume Solve the Free Will Problem?
Russell takes Hume’s commitment to naturalism (in both its feeling and scientific senses) to be

laudable in a number of respects. He praises Hume for recognizing that our concepts of freedom
and moral responsibility are not the products of metaphysical inquiry, but are a given of human
nature itself. Russell also finds Hume’s naturalism to be delightfully impervious to a form of moral
skepticism.74 Nevertheless, he argues that Hume’s specific, naturalist account of freedom and moral
responsibility is deeply flawed because he is unable to give a justificatory account of the moral
sentiments.
Hume’s account of the passions is central to his concept of moral responsibility. On
Russell’s reading, the account that Hume provides includes descriptive analysis of how our
sentiments function, but leaves out a proper justification of their functioning. But, for Russell, “the
philosopher’s concern should not be with the mechanics which generate peculiar, atomistic
sensation. It is rather, the cognitive-evaluative features involved in ascribing responsibility which
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should be the philosopher’s principal concern.”75 Because Hume fails to account for any cognitiveevaluative content of our passions, he is not able to explain how we can properly attribute
responsibility to ourselves and others by way of the passions. Russell claims that it follows from this
inability to distinguish between proper and improper functioning of the passions that Hume’s account
of moral responsibility is not satisfactory.
Russell argues that Hume’s appeal to the “calm” passions will not rescue his account of
moral responsibility. For, as with the “violent” passions, the calm passion is determined either by
reference to the feeling that arises in us upon experiencing it, or by the effect that it has on us
(physiologically or behaviorally speaking). The former is not helpful for discerning the nature of a
calm passion because, as Hume notes, “tho’ they [the calm passions] be real passions, [they] produce
little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by their immediate feeling or
sensation” (T, 2.3.4.9). We are left with the latter option. But, because different effects could result
from like passions—a passion of disapprobation may lead one agent to censure an offender, while it
may lead another agent to assault him—Russell argues,
We need to know more about the beliefs and evaluations that give rise to the hostile
behavior and conduct. Furthermore, it seems clear that the behavior and attitudes
appropriate to the moral sentiment must be interpreted as expressions of beliefs and
evaluations rather than simply as expressions of sui generis sensations. In this way, in order
to infer the presence of (calm) moral sentiments—either in our own case or in the minds of
others—we need to be able to identify the beliefs and evaluations which are expressed by
the conduct and behavior of the persons who maintain these sentiments.76
Our ability to identify the various beliefs and evaluations that are expressed by an agent’s conduct
presupposes that we have an adequate account of her character. That way we are able to recognize a
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particular performance as somehow representative of an enduring quality or character trait she
possesses.
Russell argues that this is exactly what Hume fails to provide: an adequate account of moral
character. One’s “character” is defined in terms of the various “traits” one possesses. These
character traits are defined as an enduring set of passions. But, as Russell points out, “an
understanding of a person’s character in these terms generally involves identifying the ways in which
the various passions are related to each other and shape the person’s will.” 77 It is not enough to be
able to identify the various character traits that one has, for to give a full account of one’s
“character” is to understand how these traits fit together and inform one’s actions. Despite the fact
that we always infer a person’s character from his actions, Russell stresses we cannot only count on
action description to grasp a person’s character. An agent may have various character traits that do
not intentionally manifest themselves. Consider someone that is a naturally short-tempered person,
but is gifted with the quality of “strength of mind.” She is able to control her temper, but she is never
able to rid herself of the trait: that trait would still be considered part of her character, even if it was
also true to say about her that she is strong of mind. Because all character traits create feelings of
pleasure and pain in others, her character could still be an object of disapprobation. It follows,
Russell argues, that people are ultimately held accountable just on account of how others react to
their actions. The result is that, “quite apart from anything else, this approach [Hume’s “feeling
naturalism”] leaves us entirely unable to say why some people are not appropriate objects of moral
sentiment. Hume provides us with no adequate account of the nature of moral capacities required
for a person (or creature) to be deemed an appropriate object of moral sentiment.”78
Hume needs a way to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate functioning of our
moral sentiments. His account of moral freedom, the liberty of spontaneity, may provide the
77
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necessary criterion for making such a distinction. But, as we have seen, the liberty of spontaneity
suffers from major problems. All that the liberty of spontaneity provides us with is the ability to
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions on account of the kind of connection that exists
between an agent’s action and his character. But what if an agent’s character is involuntary? What if
it comes to pass that one can have little influence over the nature of one’s character? If so, then a
theory of moral freedom that fails to take this fact into account is far too impoverished to accept.
Throughout this chapter, I have focused on my interpretative disagreements with Russell. If
Russell is right about his interpretation of Hume’s account of causal necessity and the passions, then
he is right to judge that Hume fails to give a proper justification of the moral sentiments. In the next
chapter, I construct a modified interpretation of Humean freedom and moral responsibility that, I
hope, can answer Russell’s criticism.

34

4. SOCIALIZING THE PROBLEM: HUMEAN MORAL FREEDOM

4.1

Socializing or Naturalizing?
There is good reason to reject Russell’s reading of Hume as a “feeling naturalist.” And

insofar as Russell takes the project of scientific naturalism consist solely in the attempt to provide a
descriptive, mechanical account of our sentiments, the term is not sufficiently broad to cover the
phenomena that Hume is interested in with his “science of human nature.” In light of this
observation, I argue that Hume does not seek to naturalize the problems of freedom and moral
responsibility, but socialize them. That said: Hume is undoubtedly a naturalist, as he takes the realm of
the social, or “artificial,” to be a modification of the natural (T, 3.1.2).
In Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, P.F. Strawson distinguishes between two types of
naturalism: reductive naturalism and non-reductive naturalism.79 Reductive naturalism, best exemplified
for Strawson in the work of W.V.O Quine, approaches human agents and their behaviors “simply as
objects and events in nature, natural objects and natural events, to be described, analyzed and
causally explained.”80 The reductive naturalist claims that concepts like “freedom” and “moral
responsibility” can be fully cashed out by the cognitive and behavioral sciences. The strategy of
reductive naturalism is clearly exemplified in one of its predecessors: Thomas Hobbes. Consider
Hobbes’ account of liberty. He defines “the will” as that desire which, by way of a mechanistic
process, gives rise to behavior. So long as this process achieves completion, and is not obstructed by
external forces (natural or otherwise), then the particular behavior that results is taken to be
voluntary. Hobbes treats moral responsibility in a like manner, reducing it to a consideration of
whether or not one’s action was voluntary. Many philosophers that are sympathetic to a Hobbesian
or Quinean approach to these questions are skeptical about the nature of moral responsibility. If all
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natural objects can be described in purely causal terms, and we fail to hold mountains, rocks, trees,
or dogs responsible; then we have reason to believe that our practices of holding other natural
objects responsible (adult human beings) are misguided.
In contrast to reductive naturalism, Strawson defends a form of non-reductive naturalism.
The central claim of this view is that we are “naturally social beings; given with…a natural
commitment to that web or structure of human personal and moral attitudes, feelings, and
judgments.”81 For the non-reductive naturalist, our concepts of freedom and moral responsibility
cannot be fully articulated by the cognitive and behavioral sciences because our human agency is
constituted by our social and moral relations, which are irreducibly complex. According to Strawson,
the chief error of the reductive naturalist lies in his attempt to give an account of human action
abstracted from our conditions of sociality. Though reductive naturalism succeeds in giving a
“detached” or “objective” account of the human agent, it fails to recognize that this is not a
perspective that can be inhabited indefinitely: “Our natural disposition to such attitudes and
judgments is naturally secured against arguments suggesting that they are in principle unwarranted or
unjustified just as our natural disposition to belief in the existence of body is naturally secured
against arguments suggesting that it is in principle uncertain.”82 And because the non-reductive
naturalist is able to capture a wider variety of relevant phenomena in her account of human agency
than the reductive naturalist is able to, Strawson thinks that we can say that the non-reductive
naturalist is, in fact, the more complete form of naturalism.
Russell makes much of the comparison between Hume and Strawson, arguing that both
figures claim that “we cannot understand the nature and conditions of moral responsibility without
reference to the crucial role that moral sentiment plays in this sphere” (feeling naturalism) and that
“[we should] try to understand the conditions of freedom in terms of an empirically better informed
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theory of responsibility” (scientific naturalism).83 Because Russell takes Hume and Strawson to be in
agreement on fundamental issues, we can assume that Russell considers Hume, like Strawson, to be
a non-reductive naturalist. However, the contents of Russell’s naturalistic interpretation put Hume
closer to reductive naturalism on three major points: first, Russell claims that Hume holds a regularity
theory of causation (section 2.1); second, Russell interprets Hume’s account of the passions as
purely descriptive and mechanical (section 2.2); and third, Russell argues that, for Hume, attributions of
moral responsibility are not dependent on considerations of moral freedom (section 2.3). The picture
of Hume we receive from Russell’s naturalistic interpretation is that of a modern-day Hobbesian.
I do not think this form of hard-headed reductive naturalism captures the spirit of Hume’s
philosophy. That said: I do think that Russell is right to draw attention to the philosophical parallels
between Hume and Strawson. In my estimation, Hume accepts a form of what Strawson calls a nonreductive naturalism. For the sake of clarity, though not elegance, I have chosen the alternate term
socialized to mark this interpretation, lest it be confused with Russell’s naturalized interpretation.
Hume is primarily concerned with us as moral beings, and not as mere objects of nature. Hume
closes the Treatise of Human Nature with a discussion of the anatomist and the painter. He notes that
the anatomist can give advice to the painter by providing him with “an exact knowledge of the
parts,” but that there is something “hideous, or at least minute in the views of thing, he [the
anatomist] presents” (T, 3.3.3.6). Hume judges that the anatomist, a Hobbesian of sorts, is necessary
to the science of human nature, but that he must ultimately answer to the painter: “the most abstract
speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to
practical morality; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts” (T, 3.3.3.6). For
Hume, we are of nature, but we are not mere nature: we possess capacities that are not shared by all
others that are equally of nature (trees, volcanoes, fish, rocks, etc.). On account of our shared
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capacities, we form a moral community. It is from one’s having these capacities that common
sympathies are developed and conventions are forged; and it is within this context that questions of
freedom and moral responsibility arise.
Russell considers a species of the proposed “socialized” interpretation of Humean moral
freedom, but dismisses it on three grounds:84
(1) Hume’s claim that “objects of moral sentiment should be understood, simply, as
creatures who possess pleasurable or painful mental qualities—is plainly inadequate and
unacceptable” to any account of moral freedom.85
(2) Although Hume was aware of the importance of language to moral capacity and moral
community, what he “has to say in this regard is rather thin and sketchy.” 86
(3) Hume downplays “that we have a capacity to reflect critically on our moral character and
can in some measure alter or amend our character on this basis,” an essential component of
an account of moral freedom.87
In the sections that follow, I respond to each of Russell’s concerns. By arguing that Hume holds a
normative theory of causation (section 3.2) and that the moral sentiments, which are socially reflexive
in nature, require causal inferences to function properly (section 3.3), I show that Hume does not
take just any “creatures who possess pleasurable or painful mental qualities” to be the object of the
moral judgments. In the last part of the paper (section 3.4), I respond to Russell’s second concern by
arguing that Hume takes the importance of a common moral language to be central to our ability to
make moral judgments, and thus to hold one another responsible. For Hume, it is the ability to use
this common language that ties us to our fellows, making us members of a moral community. At the
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same time, I show that, in virtue of being part of a moral community, we are able to engage in
relevant sorts of character reflection and correction.
4.2

The Normativity of Causal Reasoning
If Russell is right about Hume having a regularity theory of causation, then Hume is

committed to an account of causation that provides no criterion for demarcating correct causal
inferences from incorrect ones. And because the functioning of the moral sentiments depends on
one’s ability to make causal inferences, the regularity theory of causation leaves Hume without the
conceptual resources to label certain instances of responsibility attribution as improper. If Hume is to
have a worthwhile sentimentalist theory of moral responsibility, he needs to be able to account for,
as Russell points out, the “cognitive-evaluative” content of the passions. Over the next two sections,
I argue that Hume can meet Russell’s challenge. In this section, I argue that Hume considers causal
inferences to be normative. In the following section, I show how construing causal inferences
normatively supplies the moral sentiments with the proper cognitive-evaluative content.
What does it mean to have a normative account of causation? A regularity theory of causation
holds that the judgment “x causes y” ought to be cashed out as “ceteris paribus, x is regularly
succeeded by y.” To use A.J. Ayer’s term: on a regularity theory, for x to cause y means that they are
“factually correlated” with one another.88 In contrast, a normative theory of causation holds that the
judgment “x causes y” is more correctly understood as “there exists a law of nature governing the
relation between x and y, such that if x, then [necessarily] y.” In other words, for x to cause y means
that there is, as Hume puts, a “power or necessary connexion” that necessitates that if x happens, then
y does as well (EHU, 58).
Hume offers two definitions of “cause”: treating it as, what he labels, both a philosophical
relation (relation of concepts) and a natural relation (relation of psychological states). As a
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philosophical relation, he defines causation as “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and
where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity
to those objects that resemble the latter” (T, 1.3.14.31). This definition makes it look like Hume is
giving a regularity theory, for the governing relation between an effect and its cause is resemblance, and
not necessity. As a natural relation, he defines causation as “an object precedent and contiguous to
another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determined the mind to form the idea of the
other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other” (T, 1.3.14.31).
According to this definition, the governing relation between a cause and effect is psychological
necessity, and not resemblance. Resemblance and necessity are very different relations for Hume:
resemblance “admits of many different degrees” (1.3.13.25), while necessity fails to admit of chance or
probability (1.3.11). If the natural relation of causation is governed by necessity and the
philosophical relation by resemblance, then the two definitions do seem to be at odds with one
another: for how can a cause be merely regular, yet necessary?
One should not treat the “philosophical” and “natural” relations of cause as two separate
definitions, but as singular components of Hume’s larger account of causation. After distinguishing the
two types of causal relation, Hume states that “all causes are of the same kind” (T, 1.3.14.32), and
gives a more general account of the causal relation: “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so
united with it in imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the
impression of the one to form a more livelily idea of the other” (T, 1.3.15.35). Notice that this definition
combines the accounts of natural and philosophical causation. One experiences x and y as constantly
conjoined, which, by means of the association of resemblance, causes the mind to consider x and y
as standing in a relation of constant conjunction with one another (philosophical relation). On the
basis of this constant conjunction, the mind, upon experiencing x, is determined to form the idea of y
(natural relation). The reason why Hume chooses to distinguish between the philosophical and
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natural relations is to explain why our minds are susceptible to causal reasoning. He thinks that there
must be something about our minds such that we experience things causally at all. The concept of
“constant conjunction” is not sufficient to explain this fact about us. One could, in principle, notice
a relation of constant conjunction without concluding that the two objects in question are causally
related. Hume concludes that it is because the relation of constant conjunction has a particular
psychological effect on us that we tend to make causal inferences. In other words, it is only because our
minds are constituted in the way they are that “after a frequent repetition, I find, that, upon the
appearance of one of the object, the mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and
to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object” (T, 1.3.14.1).
After further reflection on our psychological capacities, Hume notes that we come to two
conclusions: that our mind is determined “the same with those of matter (material objects)” (T,
1.3.14.12) and that the nature of the causal relation “depends so much on the [casual] inference” (T,
1.3.14.29). Our minds are determined—in the manner that a ball is determined to fall to the ground
when thrown—to infer from cause to effect upon experiencing the constant conjunction of two
objects. At the same time, it is only through the performance of the causal inference that the causal
relation, and so the determination of our minds, is established. This line of thought seems circular. If
causal relations are dependent on causal inferences, and we are the authors of causal inferences, how
can we know if our mind is subject to the same determination as matter? Further: how can we know
if matter is actually determined if it is we, the determiners, that dictate its determinateness? But if we
look closer, Hume’s reasoning is not circular; it is reflexive. His claim is that our minds are causally
structured, and that we come to understand that this is the case through an investigation into the
nature of casual inference. For Hume, we can only investigate the structures of the mind only
indirectly, inferring its structure from experiencing what it does. The overlap between Hume and the
German Idealists on this point is notable. As Annette Baier points out, with his stress on the
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reflexive nature of the natural and philosophical relation of cause, Hume strikes “a balance between
the empiricist emphasis on the determination of our minds by nature’s constancies, and the idealist
emphasis on what only mind can contribute, the modal element, the ‘must,’ the ‘tis necessary.’”89
So what is normative about Hume’s account of causal relation? Hume claims that our minds
are naturally constituted so as to expect the future to follow the past. He refers to our tendency to
“transfer the past to the future” as a “full and perfect” habit (T, 1.3.12.10). This perfect habit of ours
accounts for the impression of mental determination that we feel when we engage in causal
reasoning. The habit functions as a rule for cognition, informing it of justified causal inferences.
Every time I decide to raise my arm, my arm goes up. If I were to ask myself, “If I decide to raise
my arm, does my arm go up?” I would immediately answer “Yes, certainly; it always has.” It is only
when we come across “contrary experiments,” or phenomena of which we have no experience, that
our perfect habit to transfer the past to the future is “weakened” (T, 1.3.22.12). In these cases, we do
not feel an impression of mental determination. So, if it were the case that one day, my arm did not
go up when I decided to raise it, I would not feel as confident in my causal claim that “if I decide to
raise my arm, then it will go up.” In cases of reduced confidence, we feel that our causal claim is
merely probable since our cognition fails to provide us with a rule for governing relations of
probability. Why not? Well, for Hume, probability is not a suitable philosophical relation:
The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of
events to such an uncertainty in the causes…But philosophers observing, that almost in
every part of nature there is contain’d a vast variety of springs and principles, which are hid,
by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that ‘tis at least possible the contrariety of
events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of
contrary causes (T, 1.3.12.5).
So, if my arm failed to go up when I decide to raise it, it must either be the case that (1) some, yet
unknown, force impeded my ability to raise my arm in this instance or (2) I was simply wrong about
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what causes my arm to go up in the first place; perhaps my bodily movement is not tied to any
“decision” I make after all. Until I can settle whether (1) or (2) is the correct explanation, I will feel
that the connection between “my decision” and “my arm going up” has yet to be established.
In this case, my habit of expecting my arm to go up when I make the decision to raise it is
confronted with what Annette Baier calls my meta-habit to expect the future to follow the past.90 My
meta-habit—which seeks to “form more specific epistemic habits”—confronts my particular habit
to expect there to be a necessary connection between my “decision” and my “bodily movement,”
and dictates the following to it: because in this instance, the future did not follow the past, you can
no longer suppose that the connection between the decision to raise your arm and your arm going
up is a necessary one.91 My meta-habit acts as a check on my more specific epistemic habit, holding
them to the standard that “what was, shall continue to be.” Not only do we provide causal structure
to our minds by the process of causal inference, but we provide the rules by which proper causal
inferences can be made by holding our epistemic habits to standards of contiguity.
By reflecting on our ability to engage in self-correction, we can see that our causal inferences are
rule-governed. Those inferences that do not track necessary connections between objects are
demoted to claims of probability, and thus do not have the same “hold” on the mind as those
inferences that are treated as authentically causal. Through reflection, we come to understand that
our ability to engage in causal inference is then not a mere reaction to our environment, but a
rational engagement with it.
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4.3

The Sentiments and their Reasons
Russell argues both that Hume is a “feeling naturalist” and that he holds a “feeling theory”

of the passions. In the previous chapter, I gave some preliminary reasons to reject Russell’s
interpretation. Hume does claim that attributions of moral responsibility are made by our sentiments,
but he does not hold a feeling theory of the passions, as he does not consider our passions to be mere
sensations. Therefore, I reject Russell’s label of feeling naturalism. The moral sentiments require causal
inferences—concerning the relation between action and motive, motive and character, etc.—to
function properly. Since these causal inferences are normative, our sentiments are not devoid of
reason, but guided by it. Further, I argue that Hume’s account of the passions is not mechanistic
because of the central role that sympathy plays in how the indirect passions function. I begin by
considering the relation between sympathy and the indirect passions.
Let us consider the passion of “pride.” Hume considers pride to be a violent, indirect
passion. Pride is a violent passion because it is a vivacious, and it is indirect because it does not arise
immediately from sensations of pleasure and pain. He distinguishes between original and secondary
causes of pride. The original cause of pride is the “double relation of impressions and ideas”: some
agent observes a beautiful house (impression) that belongs to her (idea), and she feels a sensation of
pleasure on account of the relation she has to the beautiful house qua beautiful object (impression)
and the beautiful house qua beautiful object that belongs to her (idea). But the double relation of
impressions and ideas is not enough to sustain her passion; for this, she needs other people to
validate her pride. As Hume notes, “our reputation, our character, our name are consideration of
vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches, have little
influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (T, 2.1.11.1). It is through
the secondary cause of the sympathy of others that our passions of pride—or any other indirect
passion—receive continued existence. If one planted a tremendous garden, one would feel a great
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sense of pride upon its completion; nevertheless, if the garden was never viewed by anyone except
oneself, one’s pride would likely diminish over time on account of neglect. This is, of course, why
we speak of the need to share experiences, situations, projects, etc., with others.
Sympathy does not overcome the original cause of the passion it is affixed with, but acts
reflexively with it. At one time, you may have felt proud of the tremendous garden you planted. It has
been five years since you planted it; and since then, you have learned much about the art of planting
gardens. Because of this, you do not feel the same amount of pride for the garden as you once it did.
Still, other people seem insistent on praising you for the beauty of the garden. Their praise fails to
reignite the original passion in you because, as Hume notes, “the praises of other never give us much
pleasure, unless they concur with our own opinion, and extol us for those qualities, in which we
chiefly excel” (2.1.11.13). That is to say: if the original cause of the passion is not present, the secondary
causes will fail to have an effect on you. The only way the sympathy of others could reignite our
sense of pride is if it somehow strengthened the relation between us and the object qua beautiful
object (2.1.11.5). Not only is it required that the sympathy of other people match up with our
original passion, but we must ourselves be in sympathy with those who seek to praise us. It is not
enough for anyone to praise us, for “we are not only better pleased with the approbation of a wise
man than with that of a fool, but receive additional satisfaction from the former, when ‘tis obtain’d
after a long and intimate acquaintance” (T, 2.1.11.12).92 Still, the sympathy of our fellows is necessary
for the continued existence of our indirect passions; meaning that, in a not so insignificant sense, the
functioning of the majority of our passions are dependent on our relations with others: “the
principle of sympathy is of so powerful and insinuating a nature, that enters into most of our
sentiments and passions” (T, 3.3.2.3).

Though our opinion of those that are in sympathy with our passions effects the pleasure we receive from it,
Hume notes that “popular fame may be agreeable even to a man who despises the vulgar; but ‘tis because
their multitude gives them additional weight and authority” (T, 2.1.11.19).
92
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Pride is not, strictly speaking, a moral sentiment (these are the calm, indirect passions). But
we can see, by way of Hume’s treatment of the necessary role sympathy plays in the functioning of
the indirect passions, that Russell’s “feeling theory” interpretation is wrongheaded. Russell claims
that Hume’s account of the passions concerns the “mechanics which generate peculiar, atomistic
sensations.”93 Russell’s appeal to the “effect” that the passions have on “certain modes of behavior”
is unhelpful, it provides an impoverished, atomistic account of the indirect passions.94 Indirect
passions, having two causes, are going to be defined not only by “the internal operations of the
mind” (T, 2.1.11.7), but by the relation that the particular passions stand in to the passions of our
fellows in sympathy with us. The particular passion is not only going to be defined by the kind of
sympathy that it causes in our fellows, and in what circumstances it is apt to do so, but also by the
effect that the sympathy of others will have on the original cause of a particular passion. 95 The
indirect passions can be said to be outer-directed, for it is social context as much as it is their
“mechanical” story that gives them content.
One may object by pointing out that the social is mechanical for Hume. For, he notes at the
close of the Dissertation on the Passions that, “it is sufficient for my purpose, if I have made it appear,
that, in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is
susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of
natural philosophy” (DOP, 6.19.19). I do not deny that much of Hume’s general philosophical
project is to give a mechanistic account of the various functions of our mind, but it is important to be
careful about how we parse the language in this passage. The laws of natural philosophy are all causal
laws. And though Hume stresses the primacy of causal relations in his account of association, he
Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 89.
Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 90.
95 In many ways, Hume’s attention is primarily drawn towards questions about “the effect particular passions
have on the sympathy of our fellows” and “the effect the sympathy of our feels has on the original cause of
particular passions.” For a good discussion of this, see his discussion of malice and envy (T, 2.2.8)—and,
more specifically, the effect that judgments of merit and demerit have on each of the passions.
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also claims that resemblance is central to the functioning of sympathy, and thus the passions: “‘tis
obvious, that nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never
remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a
parallel in ourselves” (2.1.11.5). It is also on account of sympathy and resemblance that we
experience the wide array of “mixed” passions that Hume considers.96 Sure, we could give the mixed
passions a more mechanistic explanation—Hume ends up appealing to “the whole bent or
tendency” of a pain or pleasure to account for their existence (T, 2.2.9.2)—but this would be to miss
the point. Even if we could account for all of our passions in terms of various mechanisms in the
mind, it is still the case that our passions are not merely mechanistic. To make the latter argument, as
Russell does, is to judge that our mental states are physical states on account of their instantiation in
the brain: a claim, to quote Sellars, that is “either very exciting but false, or true but relatively
uninteresting.”97
Now that we have discussed the social nature of the passions, let us consider the integral role
that reason plays in the functioning of the moral sentiments. Hume is claimed to have held a
“combat” theory of the relation between reason and the passions.98 Philosophers that have
traditionally held this view consider virtue to consist in the victory of reason over the passions.
Hume, insofar as we attribute this “combat” view to him, is taken to have turned this more
traditional account of virtue on its head: defining virtue instead as any “mental action or quality that gives
to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation” (EPM, 239). Further considerations of Hume’s texts
support this reading, as his definitions of “reason” and “the passions” seem to be conflicting:

See Hume’s discussion “Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice” in Treatise,
2.2.9.
97 Wilfrid Sellars, “The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem,” In the Space of Reasons (Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1997).
98 See Christine Korsgaard, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” The Constitution of Agency: Essays on
Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 27-68.
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The former [reason] conveys knowledge of truth and falsehood: the latter [the passions]
gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as
they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the other has a productive
faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal
sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cold and disengaged, is no
motive to action and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by
showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery: Taste, as it gives pleasure or
pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the
first spring or impulse to desire and volition. (EPM, 246)
But while Hume considers the function of our reason and our passions to be contrary, he does not
take them to be opposed to one another. In fact, Hume does not consider it possible that such a
conflict between our reason and our passions should ever arise. The role of reason is to “direct our
knowledge concerning causes and effects,” or give us an understanding of different possible courses
of action we can take (T. 2.3.3.2). Meanwhile, “’tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the
aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the
causes an effect of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience” (T. 2.3.3.3).
Our reason is seen as guide for our passions: feeding us understanding of our surroundings, and
telling us what courses of action enable us to best fulfill our desires. That said, it is still our passions
that serve as the spring of all our actions, and so it is only through our passions that we have the
ability to act at all.99
When a passion suggests an unwise course of action, Hume points out that the role of
reason is to suggest that said course of action undermines the ability of the passion to fulfill itself.
He thinks that our passions can be subject to our reason in two ways: “first, when a passion, such as
hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of

As Hume notes in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “here therefore reason instructs us in the
several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favour of those which are useful and
beneficial (EPM, 235).
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objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, when in exerting in passion in action, we choose means
insufficient for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects”
(T.2.3.3.6). Say I feel resentment towards my friend for stealing my first edition of Black Flag’s
“Nervous Breakdown” EP. For obvious reasons, I wish to have this record back. The resentment I
have for my friend creates the desire to assault him, which I judge will be the best way to get my
record back. How could my resentment, and subsequent action, be “incorrect,” on Humean
grounds? Well, it could be the case that I have simply misplaced the record; in which case, the
resentment I feel towards my friend would be misdirected, and so the action that flowed from it
would be equally incorrect. In this case, my resentment was directed at an object I supposed to
exist—my friend qua record thief—that, upon further investigation, did not. According to this
condition, if I had gotten the facts right, my resentment would have been properly directed. But even
if I did get the facts right, Hume thinks my passion may still be improper. Perhaps the best way to
get my record back is not to assault my friend, but to give him back a record of his that I had stolen.
In this case, because my end was to get the record back, and because my resentment motivated me
to undertake an action that would ensure that my goal was not realized, my resentment was improper.
But there are still problems about the relation between the passions and reason: reason may
somehow “have a say” in how the passions go about realizing their ends, but this does not mean
that the passions themselves are intelligent in any way. However, this is not entirely true. Hume
notes that “the moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any
means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition” (T, 2.3.3.7). So, if there was a
passion—such as malice—that dictated a mode of conduct to us that was either unreasonable or
misdirected, Hume thinks, quite optimistically, that this passion would cease to influence our
conduct. Also, remember that the passions are not mere sensations. Reason discerns the effect of
certain modes of conduct, and the effects are themselves “presented,” so to speak, to our sentiment.
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But it is because of our elementary ability to experience pleasure and pain (which makes us
susceptible to the influence of forces external to us) and our ability to sympathize with our fellow
beings (with whom we are naturally in tune) that we judge the conduct to be either proper or
improper. As Annette Baier notes:
Reason directs, while passion sets the aims. Reason can work out the effects of actions, but
the decision as to whether such effects are welcome is made by our capacity to feel pleasure
or distress, when this is influenced by our capacity to share other’s pleasure and
distress…our sense of what is admirable and contemptible and our capacity for sympathy are
enough to explain our moral judgments.100
Our already reflexive passions give us plenty of information about the needs and desires of ourselves
and others prior to the influence of reason on them. The fact that our minds are “mirrors to one
another” leads to me to naturally consider your well-being (T, 2.2.6.21). Reason will frustrate our
conduct only when the mirror has built up a layer of dust from neglect; or worse, when the mirror
has cracked.
4.4

Freedom and Moral Community
My claim in this section is simple: Hume takes freedom to consist in an agent’s being the

proper object of the moral sentiments, which requires that she possess certain capacities. In light of
these capacities, she is properly taken to be a member of the moral community. The existence of the
moral community is predicated on a common moral language and shared conventions; the agent’s
membership in the community depends on her ability to take part in them. In what follows, I
respond to Russell’s last two objections to the socialized interpretation of Humean moral freedom—
that Hume’s conception of moral capacity and language “is rather thin and sketchy,” and that he
neglects our “capacity to reflect critically on our moral character”—by arguing that Hume’s account
100
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of moral language underwrites the ability to make proper responsibility attributions, which itself
supplies a social basis for character correction.101
Attributions of moral responsibility are constituted by the moral sentiments of approbation
and disapprobation (which, are themselves taken to be a species of the calm, indirect passions). For
one to be considered morally responsible is for one to be taken as an object of the moral sentiments.
As Hume notes, “an action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? Because its view
causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind” (T, 3.1.2.3). But it is not mere pleasure or
uneasiness that invites censure or blame from our fellows, for “’tis easy to observe that it
[distinctions of virtue and vice] has also a considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so
depended on” (T, 3.3.1.29). Sympathy is required for the functioning of the moral sentiments
because all indirect passions require sympathy for their continued existence (T, 2.1.11). Even our
more violent, indirect passions—like vanity or hatred—will dissipate if they are not reinforced by
like minds. Not only are the moral sentiments inherently social (as opposed to merely sensational), but
all instances of moral judgment demand that one reference a “common moral language.” As Hume
writes:
‘tis impossible men cou’d ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose
some common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might
cause it to appear the same to all of them. Now in judging of character, the only interest or
pleasure, which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose
character is examin’d; or that of persons, who have connexion to him. And tho’ such
interests and pleasure touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant and
universal, they counter-balance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted in
speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling
or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend. (T, 3.3.1.30)
This moral language is not explicitly established, but it emerges through our natural
101
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interactions with one another. For Hume, we “back into” a moral language. All humans share the
same biological makeup and have “at least the seeds and first principles” of the moral sentiments
(EPM, 180). This natural condition, combined with humankind’s predisposition to form groups,
leads to the development of communication; first as non-verbal expression and then as a
formal language. Initially, an agent uses language to secure his interests. But over time, he learns to
use words of “intersubjective significance”: “bad,” “foul,” etc.102 Through the use of these words, the
agent learns to speak from a position that is not, strictly speaking, first-person singular. And for
Hume, as soon as we learn to set ourselves beyond ourselves, “we bring our own deportment and
conduct frequently in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and
regard us” (EPM, 225). But this moment does not mark the beginning of an impartial, abstract rule
by which we “correct” the partial sentiments of our fellows. We do not occupy a third-person
perspective, external to the moral community, when we use moral language. Instead, this ability to
step outside ourselves is conjoined with our natural propensity to feel in sympathy with our
fellows.23 We do not distance ourselves when taking the “general point of view,” but we learn to
immerse ourselves in the lives of others. The result is not a “view from nowhere,” but a view from the
“party of human kind” (EPM, 275).
How do the above considerations get us a theory of moral freedom? An agent’s ability to
make moral judgments requires that she share a common moral language with her fellows, such that
she can partake in the “common point of view” with them. If she does not share a common moral
language with others, she is not taken to have the relevant capacities for being considered within the
realm of the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. This fact is seen in how Hume
treats the relation between humans and non-human animals. The latter can only experience violent,
direct passions: “they can judge of objects only by their sensible good or evil, which they produce,
I adopt this notion of “intersubjective significance” from David Wiggins. See David Wiggins, Ethics: Twelve
Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 45.
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and from that must regulate their affections towards them” (T, 2.2.12.3). Because of this, nonhuman animals are unable to form moral sentiments (calm, indirect passions), and thus cannot make
genuine responsibility attributions. Their inability to make said judgments is reflected in how we treat
them. One can feel a sense of delight towards one’s pet, but Hume claims that our liking of them “is
not caus’d so much by relation, as in our species,” but by a more simplistic pleasure we feel in their
company (T, 2.2.12.4). In other words: we are unable to feel moral approbation for their conduct.
Hume does not consider non-human animals to be a priori excluded from our moral community—
though he admits that we would be unlikely to sympathize with them, for much of the sympathy we
feel for our fellows is based on “a peculiar similarity in our manner, or character, or country, or
language” (T, 2.1.11.5). If it were the case that non-human animals could form calm, indirect
passions, and if we came to see them as more like ourselves, Hume would have no principled reason
for stopping them from entering the moral community.
As noted previously, not all members of the moral community are taken to be equally
responsible. Hume points to three “excusing conditions.” The first condition states that an agent
that performs an evil act “ignorantly or causally” is not subject to blame (T, 2.3.2.7). So, if you
accidently take someone’s suitcase at the airport because it looks like yours, or you are physically
compelled to do so at gunpoint, Hume claims that it would be incorrect to hold you morally
blameworthy. The second excusing condition states that an agent that performs an evil act “hastily
and unpremeditatedly” (T, 2.3.2.7) is to have diminished responsibility. In our legal system, we
distinguish between first-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter for particularly this reason.
Hume wants to make the claim, and rightfully so, that there is difference between premeditatedly
murdering your wife’s lover and doing so in the “heat of the moment.” The last excusing condition
states that if an agent repents for her wrongdoing, she is absolved of blame (T, 2.3.2.7). So, if you
sincerely seek atonement for your past life of crime, Hume argues that it would not be right for us to
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persist in our considerations of you as a vicious character. In all cases, the agent is excused of some,
or all, responsibility because her conduct somehow mismatched the nature of her character: whether
it be because the “actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone,” or because the action
did not proceed from a “constant cause in the mind” or because the agent’s reformation disproves
the “just proof” of the necessary connection between the criminal act and her criminal nature (T,
2.3.3.7). Before the agent could be considered a proper candidate for the excusing conditions, it is
necessary that she be taken as a member of the moral community.
One must be careful to not conflate the following two positions: “an agent is free insofar as
she is a member of the moral community” and “an agent is free insofar as she has the relevant
capacities to be considered the proper object of the moral sentiments.” I am arguing that Hume’s
view is best represented by the latter position, and not the former. Consider the consequences of the
former position. If an agent is taken to be free on account of his membership in the moral
community, and he is in fact a member of said community, then it is impossible for him to be
considered unfree. Hume’s claim that we employ “excusing conditions” in the treatment of our fellow
members is rendered conceptually impossible by such a view. The latter position is much more
reasonable. Our membership in a moral community is a natural product of our having certain
capacities or abilities. It is these capacities, and not the membership per se, that renders us free. We
come to a better understanding of the nature of the relevant capacities through reflection on the
functioning of the moral sentiments, and our regular practices of holding one another responsible.
How does the socialized interpretation of moral freedom answer Russell’s concerns about
the ability to critically reflect on one’s character? In short, Hume is not able to answer Russell’s
specific concern. When Russell levels this criticism against Hume, he has in mind the ability of an
agent to “identify herself with her actions and feelings insofar as they are what she wants them to
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be.”103 Hume never mentions the capacity to identify oneself with one’s conduct. However, one
should not confuse his silence on this matter with a lack of concern for the nature of moral
character. When it comes to questions of morality, Hume is not particularly interested in the firstperson perspective; thus his account of “critical reflection” on one’s character, norms, society, etc.
does not take the shape of an individual deliberating about these matters. Consider the following
reflection from Hume: “pride, or an over-weaning conceit of ourselves, must be vicious; since it
causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable comparison” (T,
3.3.2.7). By recognizing the effect that our undue sense of pride has on the sentiments of others, we
are able to see that our passion is vicious, being contrary to the conduct of a person “of sense and
merit” (T, 3.3.2.10). We need not even be subject to direct censure from our fellows to reconsider our
conduct and character, for we can sympathize with the disapprobation of those we have never
met.104 I may be of a disagreeable nature, and yet sympathize with the Athenian populace’s
annoyance with Socrates on account of his disagreeable nature. This sense of sympathy I feel with
the Athenian populace could be used to temper my own disagreeable nature. From these examples,
we can see that Hume is clearly interested in correction of one’s character; he simply considers the
solution to the problem to be social, and not deliberative.
Now that I have explained the socialized interpretation of Humean moral freedom, how does
it relate to its classical compatibilist and naturalistic alternatives? The classical compatibilist interpretation
correctly points out that Hume takes freedom and moral responsibility to be inextricably linked: an
agent can be properly held responsible only if his action or character fulfills certain prior conditions
(where these conditions are cashed out in terms of capacities, abilities, or conditions of
Russell, Freedom and Moral Sentiment, 92. For more on this notion of identification, see Harry Frankfurt’s
essay “Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person,” in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical
Essays (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
104 Hume refers to this phenomenon as the double rebound of sympathy: “we sympathize with those people in
their uneasiness; and as their uneasiness proceeds in part from a sympathy with the person who insults them,
we may here observe a double rebound of sympathy” (T, 3.3.3.17).
103
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noninterference). That said: the classical compatibilist fails to grasp both the sentimentalist nature of
Hume’s account of moral responsibility, and the extent to which we gain knowledge of the capacities
necessary to our freedom through the articulation of our practices of holding one another responsible.
The naturalistic interpretation accurately recognizes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is
based in our passions; and that through an investigation into human nature, we can come to a better
understanding of our concepts of freedom and moral responsibility. Still, the naturalistic
interpretation falls short by failing to regard attributions of responsibility as dependent on judgments
about capacities or abilities that an agent possesses, and by overemphasizing the physiological and
psychological aspects of Hume’s account of moral responsibility. As I see it, the proposed socialized
interpretation cuts a middle path between the classical compatibilist and naturalistic interpretations:
recognizing the sentimentalist nature of Humean moral responsibility, but anchoring it in
considerations of one’s capacity to participate in a moral community.

56

5. CONCLUSION
With this project, I set out to provide a modified account of the naturalistic interpretation that
Paul Russell defends in this work Freedom and Moral Sentiment. Russell is right to criticize the overly
rationalist classical compatibilist interpretation, and to stress the central role the moral sentiments
play in Hume’s account of moral responsibility. However, Russell fails to consider Annette Baier’s
observation that “Hume’s project all along has been not so much to dethrone reason as to enlarge
our conception of it, to make it social and passionate.” 105 Because Russell places so much
importance on the passions, he tends to underemphasize, or miss, the fact that the moral sentiments
depend on judgments about certain capacities or abilities to function properly. It is these capacities,
which are social in origin, that constitute Hume’s account of moral freedom
Though it is a mere sketch of a theory, the socialized interpretation of Humean moral
freedom I defended in this paper has merit on three fronts. First, Russell admits that a species of the
socialized interpretation is conceivable, though implausible. I gave what I took to be an adequate
response to each of Russell’s arguments, leading me to believe that such a view is plausible. Second,
Russell is right to claim that Humean moral responsibility is deeply social, but his hesitancy to
reevaluate Hume’s concept of moral freedom leads Russell to attribute an implausible theory of
moral responsibility to Hume. The socialized interpretation of Human moral freedom preserves the
sociality of the sentiments, while providing ample room for our reason to exert its influence on
them. Third, it seems to me that we are lead to attribute the socialized interpretation of moral
freedom, or something like it, to Hume on account of the texts themselves: especially considering
his account of the passions and causal inference.
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